Food fraud: when a product is not what it claims to be

A food product can have a familiar appearance, a convincing label and completely regular packaging, but not be what it claims to be. Oil may contain a blend different from the one indicated, honey may have been altered with sugar syrups, a fish species may be sold under the name of another, more valuable one. In other cases, the geographical origin is false, or the percentage of an ingredient does not match what is stated on the label. Not all irregularities, however, are fraud. A processing error, accidental contamination or incorrectly reported information can generate a non-compliance, even a serious one, but one decisive element is missing: the intention to deceive.

The European Commission defines agri-food fraud as a suspected intentional action carried out to deceive purchasers and gain an undue advantage. The central point is not only that the product is different from what is declared. Someone must have modified, concealed or falsely represented one of its characteristics in order to obtain a benefit. It is a difficult phenomenon to measure. European authorities publish monthly reports on suspicions detected through the alert and cooperation network, but specify that the reports do not automatically correspond to frauds that have already been confirmed. They are selected pieces of information that help authorities and businesses identify possible vulnerabilities and new risks along the supply chain.

When a food product is not what it claims to be

Fraud can alter the composition of a product or build a false identity around it. The methods change, but the result is similar: buyers receive something different from what they believe they are buying. One of the most widespread practices is dilution. A valuable ingredient is mixed with a cheaper substance to increase the available quantity and reduce costs. The product often retains a credible colour, texture or flavour, especially when the addition is difficult to detect without specific analysis.

Substitution follows a similar logic. A raw material is replaced, partly or entirely, with another of lower value. This can happen with oils, meat, fish, spices, dairy products and many processed foods. A low-cost fish species may be sold under the name of a more sought-after one; a preparation may contain less of the characterising ingredient indicated on the label; an oil may be marketed as belonging to a higher category. Then there is false representation of the product. In this case, the composition may not even be altered, but a geographical origin, a species, a production method or a quality that the product does not possess is declared. The deception may concern words, images, documents, certifications, dates or information about the supply chain.

Other forms of fraud are used to conceal lower quality. A treatment may mask defects, deterioration or characteristics that would make the product less appealing. In some cases, unauthorised substances are used to modify colour, odour, texture or state of preservation. European classifications include adulteration, substitution, dilution, tampering, counterfeiting and false representation. The boundaries between categories are not always clear: a single operation can combine several forms of deception. A product may be diluted and, at the same time, sold with false documents or an incorrect origin. Not all frauds have the same consequences. Some mainly cause economic damage: consumers pay for a quality they do not receive, while honest businesses suffer unfair competition. Others can have direct effects on health. The substitution of an ingredient can introduce an undeclared allergen, while the use of banned substances or unsuitable raw materials can make the food dangerous. For this reason, food fraud is not only about authenticity. It can involve safety, quality, fairness in trade and trust. The Codex Alimentarius, the joint programme of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Health Organization, considers it a transnational problem capable of affecting the agri-food economy, consumer health and the credibility of the entire system.

Why fraud develops along the supply chain

Fraud is not distributed in the same way across all products. The risk tends to increase when a raw material has a high value, shows strong price fluctuations or can be replaced without immediately perceptible differences. Liquid, ground, mixed or highly processed foods pose a particular problem. Once the original form has been lost, it becomes more difficult to recognise species, origin and composition by sight. A consumer can look at a fruit and assess some of its characteristics, but cannot know which varieties have been used in a purée. In the same way, colour and density are not enough to establish with certainty the composition of an oil, a syrup or a sauce.

The complexity of the supply chain also plays a role. An ingredient may pass through several countries, intermediaries, warehouses and plants before reaching the finished product. Each step generates documents, transfers of responsibility and new information to verify. This does not mean that a long supply chain is necessarily less safe. It means that it requires control tools suited to its complexity. Market conditions can increase vulnerability. A poor harvest, a geopolitical crisis, a logistical disruption or a sudden increase in demand can reduce the availability of a raw material and drive up its price. When the economic gap between the authentic product and a possible substitute becomes very wide, the incentive for manipulation also grows.

Vulnerability also depends on the possibility of detecting the deception. Some alterations can be identified with relatively simple checks. Others require targeted analyses, specialised laboratories and reliable comparison data. There is no single test capable of detecting every type of fraud: the method depends on the food and on the type of manipulation suspected. The difficulty does not concern only the authorities. A producer may also receive a raw material accompanied by documents that are formally correct but do not correspond to its true identity. For this reason, control cannot be limited to inspecting the incoming product. It must include knowledge of the supplier, consistency of volumes, price trends and any unusual change in the supply chain.

Prevention means knowing the vulnerable points

Prevention starts with a concrete question: at which point in the supply chain might someone have both the interest and the possibility to alter the product without being discovered? The answer changes for every company. It depends on the raw materials purchased, the countries of origin, the number of intermediaries, the characteristics of the ingredients and the controls available. An expensive ingredient that is difficult to analyse requires different attention compared to a common raw material, purchased through a short and consolidated supply chain.

Knowing suppliers is the first step. Delivery history, relationship stability, document transparency and the ability to reconstruct product origin help assess the reliability of supply. A price much lower than the market price, an origin changed without explanation or an unusually abundant availability can be signals to investigate further. Traceability then makes it possible to connect raw materials, batches, transformations and finished products. It does not prevent fraud on its own, but it makes it more difficult to hide inconsistencies and allows the problem to be contained when a suspicion emerges. Comparing quantities purchased, used and sold can also reveal anomalies that would not be visible by looking only at the product.

Analytical controls must be built on the basis of risk. Analysing everything in the same way would be costly and ineffective. It is more useful to concentrate checks on the most exposed products, on new or anomalous supplies and on the parameters capable of revealing the specific alteration being looked for. Techniques may include chemical, spectroscopic, isotopic or genetic analyses, but their choice requires a precise question and a validated method. Companies can gather these assessments in a plan dedicated to vulnerability to fraud. In the food sector, the acronym VACCP, Vulnerability Assessment and Critical Control Points, is often used. It should not be confused with the HACCP system, which is mainly aimed at food safety hazards. In VACCP, attention shifts to economic motivation, the possibility of carrying out the deception and the likelihood that it will be detected.

The assessment cannot remain unchanged. Prices, suppliers, trade routes and adulteration techniques change over time. Authority reports, international alerts and information shared by control networks help recognise emerging phenomena and update checks. Since 2013, the European agri-food fraud network has allowed national authorities to exchange information and cooperate on cases involving several countries. The fight against food fraud therefore does not end with a laboratory test or a label check. It requires a complete view of the product and its history: where it comes from, who processed it, what transformations it has undergone and how consistent the information accompanying it is.